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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
ALBERT L. ROSS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 970015-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for eight counts of forgery, all third degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501(1995), and one count of 
communications fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-
1801 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was it plain error for the trial court not to give a sua sponte limiting 
instruction after the prosecutor commented in opening statement and closing 
argument, and elicited testimony about an accomplice witness's guilty plea and 
conviction for offenses related to the charges against defendant? 
u[A]bsent a timely objection, [this Court] will review an alleged error . . . only 
if it constitutes 'plain error'." State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989). In 
State v. Reyes. 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court reiterated a 
three-step test for plain error: 
To establish plain error, a party must show the following: (1) an error 
exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) 
the error was harmful, or in other words, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the complaining 
party. . . . The claim of plain error fails if any one of these requirements 
is not shown. 
IsL at 1057 (citing State V, Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde. 
770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
On appeal, aa party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when 
that party led the trial court into committing the error." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 
1220 (Utah 1993). Failure to object at trial, as the result of a "consciously chosen 
strategy" rather than "oversight", constitutes "conscious waiver" and precludes 
appellate review of the issue. State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah), cert. 
denied, n o s.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second 
degree felony communications fraud by establishing that the money defendant 
"obtained or sought to be obtained" through his fraudulent scheme exceeded 
$5,000? 
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"When challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the evidence 
supporting that verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient to support 
the conviction." State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996) (citing Stale 
v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)). When a defendant fails to meet this 
marshaling burden, this Court will decline to consider an insufficiency claim. LL 
When a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, this Court reviews 
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [This Court will] 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); SSS. also. State v. 
Bulk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
3. Was trial counsel's failure to request consolidation of the 8 forgery 
counts, and failure to argue that communications fraud was a lesser-included 
offense of forgery deficient performance that prejudiced defendant? 
"[W]here the ineffective assistance claim is raised for the first time on direct 
appeal, [this Court] must decide whether defendant was deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel as a matter of law. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah 
App. 1992)." State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, amendment V: 
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . . 
United States Constitution, amendment VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, die accused shall enjoy die right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of die State and district 
wherein die crime shall have been committed; which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of die accusation; to be confronted with die witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have die assistance of counsel for his defence. 
United States Constitution, amendment XIV, section 1: 
No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
widiout due process of law; not deny any person widiin its jurisdiction die 
equal protection of die laws. 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, widiout 
due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions die accused shall have die right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to testify in his own behalf . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1995): 
Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, witii purpose to defraud 
anyone, or widi knowledge diat he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated 
by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of anodier widiout his audiority or 
utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so diat die writing or die 
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication or utterance purports to be die act of anodier, whetiier die 
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person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a 
time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, 
or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other 
method of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit 
cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or 
purports to be: 
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or 
writing issued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of 
stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an 
interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim 
against any person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or 
purports to be a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other 
forgery is a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 (l)(d) (1995): 
Communications fraud - Elements - Penalties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any 
person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the 
scheme or artifice is guilty of: . . . 
(d) a second degree felony when the object of the property, money, 
or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000 . . . . 
Utah R. Evid. 103(d): 
Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a): 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with eight counts of forgery, all third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1995), and one count of communications 
fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 (1 )(d) 
(1995) (R. 57-61). The jury convicted defendant on all counts as charged (R. 100-
102). Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for zero-to-five years on each 
of the eight forgery counts, and for one-to-fifteen years on the communications fraud 
count, all to be served concurrently (R. 199). Defendant was also sentenced to total 
fines of $15,000, and an 85% surcharge. I$L The trial court later recommended that 
the prison sentence run concurrently with any other sentence defendant was serving at 
the prison (R. 219). Defendant timely appealed (R. 205-206). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On several evenings over a three-week period, defendant was involved with two 
accomplices in cashing numerous forged checks payable to "Randi Gonzalez" in 
amounts varying between $300 and $700 (305-332). Nine of the checks, totaling 
$3,665.26, were admitted against him at trial (R. 278-283, 291-296, 310-318, 335-341, 
351; State's Exhibits 1-8, 13; see. also. R. 297-299, State's Exhibit 11). 
1
 The evidence and all reasonable inferences are recited in a light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
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To carry out their scheme, defendant drove his accomplices to various stores in 
Davis and Weber county where his female accomplice, Susan Sanchez, used a false 
driver's license and social security card, which defendant and the other accomplice 
provided (R. 308-309, 310, 318, 331-332, 338-339, 343-344; State's Exhibits 12 and 
14), to cash an average of five checks an evening (R. 284-285, 286-288, 305-314; 
State's Exhibit 10). 
Defendant was caught after entering an Albertson's grocery store (where he was 
photographed by security cameras ~ R. 344-351; State's Exhibits 16-17), to see why 
Ms. Sanchez had been detained (R. 319-325, 335-341, 344, 351). She had been 
detained while store personnel contacted police after she tried to cash another forged 
check defendant provided. I$L; sfiS alS£ State's Exhibits 13 and 15. 
Ms. Sanchez pled guilty, and was convicted and sentenced before testifying at 
defendant's trial (301-302). 
Other facts necessary to the disposition of this case will be set forth in argument 
below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. It was not plain error for the trial court not to give a sua sponte limiting 
instruction after the prosecutor commented in opening statement and closing 
argument, and elicited testimony about an accomplice witness's guilty plea and 
conviction for offenses related to the charges against defendant. Since defendant 
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has failed to cite any Utah authority for the "error" he purports should have been 
"obvious" to the trial court, his plain error claims fails. Even assuming, arguendo, 
that this Court found such error, defendant's decision not to claim deficient 
performance for his counsel's failure to object, together with counsel's closing 
argument, establish that the failure to object was part of his defense strategy, and 
defendant cannot now claim prejudice. Indeed, defendant's failure to object at trial, as 
the result of a consciously chosen strategy, constituted a conscious waiver precluding 
appellate review. 
2. The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second 
degree felony communications fraud by establishing that the money defendant 
"obtained or sought to be obtained" through his fraudulent scheme exceeded 
$5,000. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the thing 
of value he "obtained or sought to be obtained" through his fraudulent scheme 
exceeded the $5,000 threshold for a second degree felony conviction for 
communications fraud. As at trial, defendant focuses his attack on the credibility of 
Ms. Sanchez, and the lack of physical evidence to support communications fraud 
beyond the checks offered on the forgery counts, which totaled less than $5,000. 
Defendant essentially argues that this Court should ignore the testimony of a 
prosecution witness. However, credibility issues are left to the trier of fact. 
Moreover, adding in amounts from the checks offered on the forgery counts is 
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unnecessary: the value evidence admitted in support of the communications fraud count 
is sufficient by itself to exceed the $5,000 threshold. 
3. Trial counsel's failure to request consolidation of the 8 forgery counts, 
and failure to argue that communications fraud was a lesser-included offense of 
forgery were not deficient performance that prejudiced defendant. Defendant 
claims that his trial counsel's failure to object to the eight separate counts of forgery 
and to his conviction for both forgery and communications fraud denied him effective 
assistance of counsel. Since neither of these objections would have been sustained 
under current Utah case law, counsel's failure to object was not deficient performance. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO 
GIVE A SUA SPONTE LIMITING INSTRUCTION AFTER THE 
PROSECUTOR COMMENTED IN OPENING STATEMENT AND 
CLOSING ARGUMENT, AND ELICITED TESTIMONY ABOUT 
AN ACCOMPLICE WITNESS'S GUILTY PLEA AND 
CONVICTION FOR OFFENSES RELATED TO THE CHARGES 
AGAINST DEFENDANT 
Defendant argues that it was plain error for the trial court not to sua sponte give 
limiting instructions after the prosecutor elicited testimony and commented in opening 
statement and closing argument about a codefendant witness's guilty plea and 
conviction for offenses related to the charges against defendant (R. 19-24). However, 
since defendant has failed to cite any Utah authority for the "error" he purports should 
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have been "obvious" to the trial court, his plain error claims fails. Even assuming, 
arguendo, that this Court found obvious error, defendant's decision not to claim 
deficient performance for his counsel's failure to object, combined with his counsel's 
closing argument, establish that the failure to object was part of his defense strategy, 
and defendant cannot now claim prejudice. Indeed, defendant's failure to object at 
trial, as part of a consciously chosen strategy, constituted a conscious waiver 
precluding appellate review. 
During his opening statement, the prosecutor made the following remarks: 
This case involves a forged check scheme. You are going to hear 
testimony from five witnesses, but one of those witnesses is a young lady 
by the name of Susan Sanchez. Now Susan Sanchez was a co-defendant 
in this particular scheme. She has already been convicted by plea and 
she'll testily to you as to the nature of that plea and what consideration 
she was given by the State for purposes of her testimony here today and 
you can evaluate her testimony in light of that. . . . 
(R. 272). 
The following exchange took place at the very beginning of Ms. Sanchez's direct 
testimony: 
Q Susan, would you state your full name for the record, please? 
A Susan Sanchez. 
Q And currently you are residing in, I think it's the Northern 
Correctional Unit or Center in Ogden? 
A The same. 
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Q And that's a correctional facility, is it not? 
A Yes. 
Q And the reason you are there as I understand it is relative to a 
sentencing in regards to these matters that are before the Court; is that 
correct? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Now, Susan, it's my recollection that we charged you in 
connection with this matter and that you pled guilty to two third degree 
felony counts; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q You also pled guilty to additional counts or counts in Ogden in 
Weber County; is that correct? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q So you are currently serving a sentence in respect to the forgeries 
that are before this Court for purposes of this trial? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Were any promises made to you, Susan, as to other than the 
agreement that we would allow you to plead to two counts and dismiss the 
other counts or any promises made to you in connection with your 
testimony here today? 
A No. 
Q Are you testifying of your own free volition? 
A Yes. 
Q Are there any charges that are presently pending against you that 
have not been disposed of, to your recollection? 
11 
A No. 
(R. 301-302). 
During his closing argument, the prosecutor said: 
. . . You have Susan Sanchez's testimony and you say to yourself, Okay. 
Why should I believe Susan Sanchez? Why should I believe her over the 
defendant who says he had nothing to do with this? Well, you have to go 
back to your instructions and you have to, if you'll recall, the Court gave 
you an instruction, I think it was Instruction K, and in that instruction the 
Court was talking about different things that you can look at in terms of a 
witness, or you might want to look at in terms of the witness, to 
determine whether or not their testimony is credible. The demeanor and 
deportment on the witness stand. That's one of the things you can look 
at. I think Susan Sanchez was very believable in her testimony. You can 
look at her interest in the results of the trial. What did she have to gain? 
She has already been incarcerated as a result of her pleading guilty on 
charges in connection with these proceedings, so what what [sic] was 
there for her to gain by giving her testimony? 
(R. 416-417). 
Since there was no defense objection to the prosecutor's questions or comments, 
this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, and may be reviewed only for plain 
error. Whittle. 780 P.2d at 821. To establish plain error, defendant must show that 
1) an error exists; 2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 3) the 
error was harmful, or in other words, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result for defendant. ReyfiS, 861 P.2d at 1057. 
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A. Defendant Has Failed To Establish Anv Error That Should Have Been 
Obvious To The Trial Court. Defendant has failed to cite any Utah authority for his 
argument that the prosecutor's questions and comments concerning the accomplice's 
plea were error, let alone obvious error (Def. Br. at 18-24), and the State has found 
none.2 Without controlling appellate authority on an issue, there can be no error, let 
alone error that should have been "obvious" to a trial court. State v. Saunders. 893 
P.2d 584, 589 (Utah App. 1995) ("Given the Utah Supreme Court's struggle in dealing 
with [this issue], we cannot say that any error the trial court committed . . . would have 
been obvious to the trial court. . . [and, therefore,] we need not consider the other 
aspects of plain error analysis"); State v. Cook. 881 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah App. 1994) 
(primary reason for concluding that the error was not plain was the fact that the trial 
court did not have the benefit of a supreme court opinion on the issue); State v. 
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah) (court determined not to apply the plain error 
2
 In support of his "obvious error" argument, defendant omitted the italicized 
portion of the following sentence from United States v. Handly. 591 F.2d 1125, 1128 
(5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted) (see Def. Br. at 18): 
The law is clear in the Fifth Circuit that a prosecutor's reference to 
the guilty pleas of a defendant's coconspirators is plain error and grounds 
for reversal, even absent objection by defense counsel at the time of the 
improper comment. 
Bui see United States v. Christian. 786 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1986) (testimony of 
codefendant that he had pled guilty to conspiracy was properly admitted as evidence of 
codefendant's credibility as witness, and, where counsel failed to request cautionary 
instruction, trial judge's failure to give such instruction sua sponte was not plain error). 
13 
doctrine where applicable statutory language was not explicit, and the "trial court did 
not have the benefit of [a later] appellate decision interpreting the statute's 
requirement"), cert, denied. 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). 
Therefore, since he has failed, at the outset, to establish error that should have 
been obvious to the trial court, defendant's plain error claim fails. Saunders. 893 P.2d 
at 589 (after finding that "any error . . . would [not] have been obvious to the trial 
court," court concluded it "need not consider the other aspects of plain error 
analysis"); Rsyss, 861 P.2d at 1057 ("[t]he claim of plain error fails if any one of [the 
three] requirements is not shown"). 
B. Because His Failure To Object Was Based On His Trial Strategy. Defendant 
Has Waived Any Prejudice Claim- Even assuming, arguendo, this Court found 
obvious error, defendant cannot claim prejudice because the record reflects that 
defendant's failure to object was based on his trial strategy. Ironically, that is the 
ultimate holding of the case defendant has cited in support of his "obvious error" 
argument: 
Where, however, the record indicates that defense counsel's failure to 
object to an improper comment was part of his defense strategy, then the 
defendant will not be heard to claim he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's 
indiscretions. 
Handly, 591 F.2d at 1128 (citations omitted).3 This ultimate holding, that a defendant 
3
 Handly. involved the prosecutor's comments on the guilty pleas of non-testifying 
codefendants. In United States v. Leach. 918 F.2d 464, 467-468 (5th Cir. 1990), fiejL 
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waives a prejudice claim where his failure to object was part of his defense strategy, 
does find support in Utah case authority. See State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158 
(Utah 1989) (citations omitted) (supreme court does not reach the issue of plain error in 
child sexual abuse case, concluding counsel failed to object as part of trial strategy), 
cert, denied. 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990); State v. Winward. No. 960274-CA, slip op. at 12-
14 (Utah App. June 12, 1997) (conscious tactical decision not to object waives right to 
appellate review). 
Defendant's decision not to claim deficient performance for his counsel's failure 
to object implicitly acknowledges a conscious trial strategy, and, in any event, waives 
any argument to the contrary now (see. Point HI, below). See also State v. Garrett. 
849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App), cert.denied. 869 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (to prevail on a 
claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's actions 
were not conscious trial strategy, and that there was a lack of any conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's actions). 
Defense counsel's closing argument is also significant in establishing waiver 
because it disclosed the defense's central theory that Susan Sanchez committed the 
crimes with which defendant was charged, and that her testimony against him was the 
result of a self-serving deal with the State, and therefore not credible (see R. 419-424, 
denied, 111 S.Ct. 2802 (1991), the Fifth Circuit likewise found no reversible error 
where the codefendant did testify, and the defense trial tactics included frequent 
references "to the bargain he likely struck with the government in exchange." 
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addendum A). Defense counsel repeatedly argued that Ms. Sanchez's admission to 
committing forgery established that she was a liar and could not be trusted (R. 419-
422). He concluded his argument by repeatedly asserting that "she would not be up 
there today unless she felt she was going to get something for it" (R. 424). Thus, as in 
Handle, a[i]t is clear from a thorough review of this record t h a t . . . . defendant's 
emphasis on the [codefendant's guilt] . . . was the defense he chose to employ and not 
a defense which may or may not have been resorted to depending upon the content of 
the prosecutor's statement." Handly., 591 F.2d at 1128. 
In sum, because the jury's knowledge of his codefendant's guilt was central to 
his defense, defendant cannot now claim prejudice. £e_£ Handly. 591 F.2d at 1128-
1129. Indeed, Utah law is even more explicit: defendant's failure to object at trial, as 
the result of a "consciously chosen strategy," constituted a "conscious waiver" 
precluding appellate review. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-159; sss also. Winward. slip op. 
at 12-14. 
Point II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE FELONY 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD BY ESTABLISHING THAT THE 
MONEY DEFENDANT "OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE 
OBTAINED" THROUGH HIS FRAUDULENT SCHEME 
EXCEEDED $5,000 
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Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the money 
he "obtained or sought to be obtained" through his fraudulent scheme exceeded the 
$5,000 threshold for a second degree felony conviction for communications fraud (Def. 
Br. at 24-31). As at trial (see. R. 423), defendant focuses his attack on the credibility of 
Susan Sanchez, and the lack of physical evidence to support communications fraud 
beyond the checks offered on the forgery counts, which totaled less than $5,000 (Def. 
Br. at 27-31). Defendant essentially argues that this Court should ignore the testimony 
of a prosecution witness. However, credibility issues are left to the trier of fact. 
Moreover, adding in amounts from the checks offered on the forgery counts is 
unnecessary: the value evidence admitted in support of the communications fraud count 
is sufficient by itself to exceed the $5,000 threshold. 
When a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, this Court reviews 
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [This Court will] 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); see alSQ State v. 
Elirk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Defendant 
has failed to meet his appellate burden. 
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A. The Evidence Is Sufficient To Establish That The $5.000 Threshold Was 
Met. In order to convict a defendant of second degree felony communications fraud, 
the prosecution must establish that the thing of value "obtained or sought to be 
obtained" through the fraudulent scheme "is or exceeds $5,000." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-1801(l)(d) (1995). The evidence against defendant in support of this value 
element follows: 
Q Okay. Now you indicated that on that first occasion you probably 
cashed three or four checks; is that correct? 
A Uh-huh. Yes. 
Q Did you have occasion to go out at any other time and cash checks 
during the month of November? 
A Yeah. 
Q Can you remember approximately how many times you went out 
and cashed checks? 
A It had to have been about two or three times a week. 
Q Okay. And on each of those occasions, do you remember how 
many checks you would cash on each occasion, the approximate number? 
A Five. 
Q Five? Okay. Did this check cashing go on in Weber County and 
Davis County?4 
4
 Defendant claims the fact that the scheme traversed two counties "raises 
jurisdictional questions" (Def. Br. at 31). His assertion may be quickly disposed of. 
The Utah Constitution states that,' M[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to . . . a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
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A Yeah. 
Q Okay. Can you tell us what cities that you recall you cashed 
checks in? 
A It was Ogden, Roy and out at South Ogden. 
Q Okay. Did you cash any in Davis County, any cities in Davis 
County that you recall? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember what cities it was? 
A I don't. 
Q Okay. Did you always use the same ID of Randy [sic; should be 
"Randi"] Gonzales when you cashed these checks? 
A Always. 
Q Okay. Did you always follow the same procedure on each of those 
occasions that you went out and cashed checks that you just told us about 
that you did on the first occasion? 
A Yes. 
Q You were always handed the check? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you ever see the checks before you arrived at the merchants 
[sic] place? I mean, did they ever show you the checks ahead of time? 
A Oh, no. 
offense is alleged to have been cpmmitted . . . ." Utah Constitution, article I, section 
12 (emphasis added). The Second Judicial District, in which defendant was tried, 
includes Davis and Weber counties. Therefore, there is no jurisdictional issue. 
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Q Okay. Can you tell us the approximate amount that these checks 
would be made out for? 
A Some had been made out for $700, some would be made out for 
$300. 
(R. 312-314) 
Q Okay. Now, to go back to your earlier testimony, you said that 
you would go out maybe two or three times a week? 
A Yes. 
Q And on each of those occasions, can you tell us who drove you to 
these various places? 
A Albert [defendant]. 
Q Okay. Did that occur every time Randy [sic]. 
A Yes, it did. 
Q Did you ever go in any other vehicle when you cashed these 
checks. 
A No. 
Q Okay. At the conclusion of going out and cashing these checks 
each time, did you receive any money for the cashing of these checks? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. Did you ever see any money given to Mr. Ross 
[defendant]? 
A Yes. 
(R. 318). 
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Defendant's check cashing scheme extended for approximately three weeks: the 
first check in evidence against defendant is dated November 2, 1995 (State's Exhibit 1), 
and defendant's accomplice, Susan Sanchez, was arrested on November 22, 1995, with 
defendant arrested shortly thereafter (R. 288-289, 319, 342-344). 
Taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, the evidence was sufficient, without adding in the amounts of the 
checks admitted on the eight forgery counts, to establish that the amount defendant 
obtained or sought to obtain through his check cashing scheme exceeded $5,000. 
Arriving at this conclusion only requires simple mathematics. Susan Sanchez testified 
that defendant drove her in his car to cash forged checks 2-3 times a week over a 
period of approximately three weeks (R. 313) - or a total of six to nine times. She also 
testified that she cashed an average of five checks each time they went (R. 313) r? or 
between 30 to 45 total checks. The State offered eight checks in support of the eight 
forgery counts (gfi£ State's Exhibits 1-8). Subtracting those eight checks still leaves a 
total of between 22 to 37 checks. Susan Sanchez testified that the amounts of those 
checks varied between $300 and $700 (R. 314).5 Twenty-two checks multiplied by the 
smallest amount of any of the checks &JL., $300) yields a total of $6,600 which easily 
exceeds the $5,000 threshold for a second degree felony conviction under 
5
 The average amount of the eight checks offered against defendant on the 
forgery counts was $410.63 (State's Exhibits 1-8; see also. R. 428). 
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communications fraud. Utah Code Ann. §76-l-1801(l)(d) (1995). Indeed, 37checks 
multiplied by the smallest amount ($300) equals $11,100, more than double the $5,000 
threshold. Id. 
B. Defendant's Credibility Argument Is Not Properly Before This Court. 
Defendant essentially argues that this Court should ignore the mcriminating testimony 
of Ms. Sanchez, and accept his own flat denials that he had anything to do with the 
check cashing scheme (Def. Br. at 30; S££ R. 359-360). He argues that "the State 
presented no evidence, other than the speculative and unclear testimony of Ms. 
Sanchez, that Defendant sought to obtain property or money in excess of [sic] statutory 
requirement of $5,000" (Def. Br. at 30; emphasis added).6 However, defendant's 
credibility argument is improper on appeal: 
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as 
the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 
be given particular evidence. [Citations omitted] Ordinarily, a reviewing 
court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must 
resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. [Citation 
omitted] 
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). The supreme court concluded that 
in "some unusual circumstances" a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility, 
6
 In footnote 11 of his brief (Def. Br. at 30), defendant asserts that it "arguably 
constitute^] prosecutorial misconduct" for the prosecutor to argue inferences based on 
Ms. Sanchez's testimony. The State will not respond to this argument, except to note 
that witness testimony at trial does not constitute a "matter outside the evidence." See 
State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). 
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such as where there is "either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its 
falsity must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." I$L (citations 
omitted). Since such unusual circumstances do not exist in this case, the jury's 
credibility determinations should not be disturbed. 
In sum, defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn 
from it are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 
at 235. 
Point m 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST CONSOLIDATION 
OF THE 8 FORGERY COUNTS, AND FAILURE TO ARGUE 
THAT COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD WAS A LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF FORGERY WAS NOT DEFICIENT 
PERFORMANCE 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel's failure to object to the eight separate 
counts of forgery and to his conviction for both forgery and communications fraud 
denied him effective assistance of counsel (Def. Br. at 33-38). Since neither of these 
objections would have been sustained under current Utah case law, counsel's failure to 
object was not deficient performance. 
The legal standard for the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel was established by Strickland v. Washington. 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), and 
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adopted by Utah courts. To support a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must 
show that "his or her counsel performed deficiently such that the performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and that the 
performance was prejudicial, such that absent the error, a different outcome was 
reasonably likely." State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 893-894 n.30 (Utah 1989), cejL 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 163 (1989). a[W]here the ineffectiveness claim is raised for the first 
time on appeal, [this Court] must decide whether defendant was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. State v. EUifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175 
(Utah App. 1992)." State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993). 
A. Since Each Act Of Forgery Was A Distinct Offense. Consolidation Was Not 
Appropriate. Defendant claims that trial counsel's failure to object to the Amended 
Information was deficient performance (Def. Br. at 33-35). The information charged 
defendant with eight separate counts of forgery (R. 57-61). Essentially, defendant 
argues that since his forgeries were all part of the same scheme to defraud, trial counsel 
could have objected and had the charges consolidated into one single forgery count 
(Def. Br. at 33-35). However, defendant mischaracterizes forgery by equating it with 
theft or embezzlement (see Def. Br. at 34). Unlike theft or embezzlement, where the 
law's focus is on what is taken, forgery punishes the act of altering a writing. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1995). Each instrument forged by defendant was a distinct 
offense punishable by a distinct sentence. 
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Generally, crimes are merged if they arise out of the same transaction, such as 
several small thefts which are part of the same embezzlement scheme. State v. Crosby. 
927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996); State v. Kimbel. 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980). 
However, this doctrine has never been applied to forgery and such an application was 
recently rejected by this Court in State v. Patience. No. 960399-CA (Utah App. August 
14, 1997). In response to a similar ineffective assistance claim, this Court held that 
related acts of forgery are distinct offenses because, unlike theft, "the essence of the 
crime of forgery is not the end, i.e., what is obtained by the forgery, but the means, 
e.g., by signing the name of another with the intent to defraud." I&., slip op. at 16 
i; i 4. Thus, each document forged is a distinct offense even if the documents are 
forged at the same time and in the course of one transaction.7 
Here, defendant was a party to forging at least eight separate checks. Each of 
these acts was a distinct offense justifying the State's decision to charge defendant with 
eight counts of forgery. Since Utah does not require consolidation for forgery, any 
objection by trial counsel would have been fruitless. Patience, slip op. at 16 n.14; 
Brooks. 908 P.2d at 862. 
7
 Other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue have reached the same 
conclusion. Sei, £*&., Ebenezer v. State. 383 S.E.2d 373, 374 (Ga. App. 1989); State 
v. Taylor. 551 P.2d 589, 590 (Ariz. App. 1976); People v. Neder. 94 Cal. Rptr. 364, 
366-367 (Cal. App. 1971). 
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B. Communications Fraud Is Not A Lesser Included Offense Of Forgery. 
Defendant's second contention is that trial counsel should have objected to the 
communications fraud charge since it is a lesser included offense of forgery (Def. Br. 
at 35-38). Again, this objection would have been fruitless because the elements for 
forgery do not encompass the elements for communications fraud. Communications 
fraud requires communication with a third party while forgery does not. fise Utah 
Code Ann. §§76-6-501 (1995) and 76-10-1801(1) (1995), pp. 5-6, above. 
Utah courts apply a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a lesser offense 
is so similar to a greater offense that a defendant cannot be charged with both. State 
v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983). Initially, courts compare the statutes side-by-
side to determine whether "the two crimes are such that the greater cannot be 
committed without necessarily having committed the lesser." I$L (citations omitted). 
Although, in this case, there is potential overlap between the two statutes, the courts 
apply this theoretical comparison strictly. Sfifi Duran v. Cook. 788 P.2d 1038, 1040 
(Utah App. 1990) (similar ineffective assistance claim). 
Defendant incorrectly assumes that forgery's requirement of a writing is 
necessarily the same as acommunicat[ing] directly or indirectly with any person," an 
element of communications fraud (Def. Br. at 37). However, unlike communications 
fraud, forgery does not require a third party, although another person is often involved. 
For example, if a forged check is discovered subsequent to the arrest and search of a 
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suspect, the forgery may be complete even though no communication has occurred. 
Here, defendant committed forgery each time he was a party to signing a stolen check, 
without doing more. Transmitting the forged checks to an accomplice to cash at the 
stores made defendant a party to the separate offense of communications fraud. Sfi£ 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1995) (party liability). Thus, although elements of two 
crimes may overlap in a particular case, courts uphold separate convictions because the 
elements of the greater offense do not automatically encompass those of the lesser 
offense.8 
Although defendant correctly states the proper framework for analysis, he 
applies the analysis to this case in a summary fashion. Without actually comparing the 
statutes, defendant simply argues that "[a] comparison of the elements, as set forth 
above, indicates that communications fraud is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the commission of forgery" (Def. Br. at 37). As 
demonstrated above, this is not accurate. Forgery does not require a communication, 
merely an act of altering, making, or executing a writing. Since one can commit 
forgery without committing communications fraud, the two crimes do not merge. 
In most situations, this comparison of elements "is sufficient to determine 
whether a lesser included relationship exists between two crimes." State v. Brooks. 
' Utah courts have used this analysis to find separate offenses between seemingly 
similar crimes. The best example is Utah's refusal to merge burglary and theft charges. 
Duxan, 788 P.2d at 1040-41. 
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908 P.2d 856, 862 (Utah 1995). Since forgery can be committed "without necessarily 
having committed" communications fraud, the two crimes are separate offenses. Hill. 
674 P.2d at 97. Therefore, trial counsel was not deficient in failing to make an 
objection.9 
In sum, counsel's decisions not to object were reasonable. Neither objection 
was supported by Utah case law so trial counsel's performance was not deficient. 
Because he has not established deficient performance, defendant's ineffective assistance 
claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2#Tday of August, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
9
 Since defendant argues only the first prong of the Hill test (Def. Br. at 36-37), 
analysis under the second prong is unnecessary. Duran. 788 P.2d at 1040-41. 
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Addendum A 
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was brought into the room in the bank with the defendant, 
that she was asked the question as to whether or not the 
defendant was with her and she said, Yes. And then she 
indicated that she looked over at him and with the look and 
she immediately perceived that that was a mistake. She was 
scared and so she told the officer at that point, Well, no. 
But then when she was taken to the police station in South 
Ogden, she laid it all out for them. She laid out her 
involvement and she confessed to them as to her involvement 
with all of these checks and she laid it out for them in 
respect to his involvement with her, which was consistent 
with the scenario that you seen happen at that time. 
I think if you'll examine the testimony in light of 
what's gone on here and the testimony of the officer's as 
well as Susan Sanchez, that you'll come to the conclusion 
fairly readily, not only did these crimes occur, but that the 
defendant was involved up to his neck in committing these 
crimes. He is a party to the offense and he should be 
convicted accordingly. Thank you. 
THE COURT: You may provide your closing, Mr. 
Albright. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Thank you, Your Honor. I want to 
talk with you directly for just a few minutes about the 
evidence that you have heard today, because that's what you 
draw the inferences and conclusions from, the evidence that 
ov 
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1 you have seen, not the speculation, not conjecture. I admit 
2 to you that Susan Sanchez or Sandy Sanchez, or Randy Gomez, 
3 whatever name she has gone by is a pathological liar, and she 
4 has told you that much from the stand today. 
5 Let me be specific. Let me talk with facts of the 
6 case. She has told you that she has lied to the police. On 
7 each one of these checks she lied about the name that she put 
8 on checks one through eight. Every single one has her 
9 fingerprint, or not fingerprints, her John Henry, you might 
10 say, her signature and that's a lie. The signature is not 
11 the correct signature. She tells you that. It's not 
12 something I am making up. That's the evidence that is before 
13 you. What else has she lied about? She has lied about each 
14 one of these checks that she used a false ID. She tells you 
15 that she used a card with not her picture on it. She 
16 represented herself as the individual in the picture. She 
17 tells you from the evidence of the witness stand that that's 
18 not her signature on this card. Every single one of these 
19 eight checks she did the same thing. This is me. Give me 
20 your money. 
21 Other lies, social security card that she gave. 
22 Randy Lynn Gomez. When she gave that to the officer when she 
23 was arrested, that was a lie. Now, what else has she lied 
24 about? She lied that she didn't know Albert Ross. Now, I'll 
25 tell you where she messed up and this is a question that I 
x> 
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1 want you to see if Mr. Wilson answers, because he gets 
2 another chance to talk to you, I don't, this is my only 
3 chance and see if you can resolve this. When she took the 
4 witness stand for the second time she said, Albert Ross, I 
5 don't know him. I don't know who he is. He doesn't know my 
6 family at all. And yet# Albert Ross was able to tell you 
7 under oath who her sister was. Where did he get that? How 
8 did he know who her sister was if he doesn't know the family 
9 like he tells you he does? 
10 But, even more important than that, and this is the 
11 critical statement that I think she made that shows she is a 
12 liar, and that is she tells you that she two years ago had a 
13 boyfriend in jail. She also told you, the last question I 
14 asked her, I didn't have a phone at that time. Now, how 
15 could Albert Ross come up with a fantastic story that just 
16 happens to be a cosmic coincidence that he tells you under 
17 oath, She had someone at the jail. He made a call to my 
18 home more than once and I would go over to her home and get 
19 her. In order for that story to make sense, two things had 
20 to take place. One, she had to have someone in the jail 
21 trying to phone her and she didn't have a phone. Now, if he 
22 didn't know the family, if he didn't know her in some way, 
23 how could he pull that story out of thin air and be able to 
24 testify to you that under oath. 
25 Now, you see, she didn't know what he had testified 
N > 
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1 I to because she was out of the courtroom. So she had no idea 
2 that he was able to tell you that, no idea at all. And from 
3 that alone, she is lying. Now, what does she have to gain? 
4 Let me come back to that. The State is trying to put them 
5 together somehow and they give you these photographs, they 
6 want you to look- at them. As you look at them, Number 15 is 
7 her separate account. He is not in that picture and the 
8 officer told you that. Number 16. Albert Ross walking by, 
9 coming into the store, walking by where the security camera 
10 was. She is not in that picture. It is only Albert Ross, 
11 Number 16. Now, we want to put them together somehow and the 
12 State has used Number 17 in order to do that. Now, they are 
13 together in this picture, but I want you to look at it 
14 closely. There is an officer behind Albert Ross. You can't 
15 maybe see it real well here, but it's the last picture, 
16 Number 17, 
17 You'll see from this picture they are both in 
18 handcuffs, so they have been handcuffed. It looks like they 
19 are being brought around the table and she is starting to sit 
20 down at the table. I assume that this is the conference or 
21 office of one of the employees where they took them and they 
22 interviewed them. But, you will see from this that he is 
23 being herded into the area. It wasn't where he was just 
24 walking by. He is being herded. He is handcuffed. She is 
25 handcuffed and the officer is behind Mr. Ross directing him 
< * 
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1 obviously where to go. It's from that they want you to draw 
2 the conclusion that they were together at the store. It 
3 doesn't make sense. 
4 Now, with the communications fraud counts, the very 
5 last count I'll just touch on briefly. The specific evidence 
6 you have with regards to this scheme that Susan Sanchez was 
7 involved in are these eight checks. Total them up. They d. 
8 not total $5,000. They are under $5,000. From my position, 
9 for that reason alone the element of having the value of the 
10 property or things to be obtained, they have to show it was 
11 in excess of $5,000. Add those checks up. They don't add up 
12 to $5,000. Now, the State would have you gather other checks 
13 out there somewhere and lump them together and then find 
14 $5,000 worth, but you have no evidence of that today. You 
15 have no specifics as to what checks she cashed above those. 
16 You don't have the checks in front of you. You don't have 
17 the amounts on those checks. You don't know where they were 
18 cashed. You don't know who the owner of the checks were. 
19 You don't know who the bank was that they were drawn on. 
20 Everything else other than the evidence you have today is 
21 speculation with regards to that count. And for that reason, 
22 alone, I suggest you should find Mr. Ross not guilty on that 
23 communications fraud. 
24 Now, let me specifically tell you what her motive 
25 is here to lie. She is either protecting somebody else or 
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she is going to get a favorable treatment. I know no 
promises have been made to her. She is in a State 
Correctional Facility and she is aiding the State. I submit 
to you she would not be up there today unless she felt she 
was going to get something for it. 
Now, with regards to covering for someone else, 
remember she told you, Well, I had a boyfriend and I was 
bringing home groceries and I am bringing home money and he 
doesn't say a thing about it. We know she has had 
boyfriends, obviously from her testimony, that have been in 
jail. Now, from that I think you can conclude two things for 
her getting on the stand today and lying. She is covering 
for somebody and Albert Ross was there at the store, who he 
says is just within five miles of his home, and he was at the 
wrong place at the wrong time. She did know him and now she 
is going to pin this on him instead of somebody else, or in 
the alternative, I submit she is going to try and get a 
benefit from this for favorable treatment. She has already 
got a plea bargain that she pled guilty to reduced charges. 
And as I said, I feel that she would not be here today unless 
she felt she was going to get something else. I'll submit it 
to you and I ask you to find Albert Ross not guilty. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wilson? 
MR. WILSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Albright is 
c$ 
